“Is China Living a Minsky Moment? Between the “Lender of Last Resort” and the Chinese Shadow Financial System” by Girón, Alicia
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mjei20
Journal of Economic Issues
ISSN: 0021-3624 (Print) 1946-326X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mjei20
Is China Living a Minsky Moment? Between the
“Lender of Last Resort” and the Chinese Shadow
Financial System
Alicia Girón
To cite this article: Alicia Girón (2018) Is China Living a Minsky Moment? Between the “Lender
of Last Resort” and the Chinese Shadow Financial System, Journal of Economic Issues, 52:2,
445-454, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2018.1469900
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2018.1469900
Published online: 11 Jun 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
 Alicia Girón is a researcher in the Economics Research Institute and the coordinator of the University Program of Asia 
and Africa Studies at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). She is grateful to Francisco González 
Munive and Denisse Vélez (CONACYT’s scholarship) for their support, and to Libertad Figueroa for translating the 
Spanish version of this article into English. The article was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for 
Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) and is part of the projects IN301918 “Financial Geography and Institutions in the 
World Economy” and IN301015 “Global and Regional Financial Competition: Post-Crisis, Financial Models,” 
supported by DGAPA, UNAM. 
 
1 The Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (commonly referred to as 
Shíjiǔ Dà, or, in Chinese, 十九大) was held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 18-24, 
2017. 
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Abstract: After Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008, the Central Bank of China 
(PBOC) created a big 1.8 trillion dollars package to boost the Chinese economy. It 
was a necessary key measure not only to prop up the economy, but also to try to 
preserve the two-digit growth of the GDP that existed before the Great Recession. 
The financial instability of international financial circuits made necessary the 
involvement of the central bank. Ten years later, China’s debt explosion went up 
during the financial crisis, from six to twenty-eight trillion dollars between 2007 
and 2016. In other words, it went up from 148 to 260 percent of GDP during the 
same period. The goal of this article is to analyze whether China is living a “Minsky 
moment” or not, and what its implications are for international financial markets. 
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Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, said during the Nineteenth 
Communist Party gathering in Beijing:1 “If we are too optimistic when things go 
smoothly, tensions build up, which could lead to a sharp correction, what we call a 
‘Minsky Moment.’ That’s what we should particularly defend against” (Wildau 2017). 
This statement is true. During the financial crisis and after Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, China’s debt exploded from six trillion dollars in 2007 to twenty-eight 
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trillion dollars at the end of 2016, or from 148 to 260 percent of the GDP during the 
same period (Wildau and Weinland 2016).  
Since 2009, rating agencies like Fitch Ratings (2011) have been considering the 
importance of non-performing loans (NPLs), the leverage in the Chinese financial 
system (CFS), and the risks in the Chinese shadow banking system (CSBS). By 
implementing “lender of last resort” policies and with the participation of big state 
banks, regional banks, and new institutional financial investors, credit has continued 
to expand in China in order to keep the economy within its two-digit pre-crisis GDP. 
During the Great Recession, the PBOC was trying to induce economic growth, but 
the international environment was not the optimal path for the Chinese economy. 
What resulted from these PBOC activities was a strong and fast debt 
accumulation that characterized the CFS. Today, the CFS is fraught with the growing 
debt of corporations, overdue portfolios, and nonperforming loans of banks and 
institutional investors. At the same time, international financial organizations and 
rating agencies have grown concerned with the financial fragility of the Chinese 
economy, largely caused by the indebtedness and instability of CSBS. During the 
Eighteenth Communist Party gathering, the Chinese president Xi Jinping announced 
economic and financial reforms — including the “One Belt, one Road” (OBOR) 
policy — designed to usher in a new pattern of economic development for inducing 
and satisfying internal markets as well as adjusting to globalization to the benefit of 
Chinese private and public corporative groups. 
 
Big Government in a Monetary Economic Production 
 
According to Hyman Minsky (1964, 315), “big government” means “a blessing when 
it prevents debt deflations and deep depressions.” In a capitalist economy, demand 
must be guaranteed by consumption spending generated through employment 
creation. A capitalist economy is a market economy and “[it] is a financial 
system” (Minsky 1992, 16). In the post-crisis period, the Chinese financial system, 
assisted by PBOC, has been transforming into a capitalist economy through financial 
circuits. Therefore, Minsky’s analysis is relevant. The deregulation and liberalization 
of the financial process induced the transformation of the Chinese financial system 
form “hedge” to “speculative.” 
Statistics from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2017) show that, in 
2007, the total amount of granted credit to the non-financial2 system went from 143 
to 258 percent of GDP, growing at an annual rate of 5.7 percent until it reached 
5,207 billion dollars. Measuring the magnitude of the problem, it means that the debt 
which non-financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions, and the 
government would have to pay is two and a half times larger than the size of the 
second major economy of the world — the Chinese economy. Despite the boost 
provided by the central bank, economic growth is far from the two-digit numbers that 
2 The total credit is broken down into (i) credit to non-financial corporations, (ii) credit to 
households and non-profit institutions serving households, and (iii) credit to general government (BIS 
2017).  
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it had reached at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and during the last six 
years China’s average annual growth rate has been 7.6 percent and the IMF so far 
correctly predicted a 6.8-percent growth for 2018 (IMF 2017). With the objective of 
maintaining high economic growth rates, the PBOC has increased liquidity of the 
economy since 2009 through a credit expansion policy channeled via the traditional 
banking system and feeding the development of shadow banking.3 
The emergence of financial fragility and instability corresponds to a moment in 
the economic cycle (Girón and Chapoy 2009) when, even though credit granted has 
increased, it is not affecting the economy equally (Figure 1). It may be said that an 
agent’s indebtedness is not being supported by an equally increasing growth, which 
hurts the profitability of investments and hinders the repayment of loans. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship Between Total Credit and GDP 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BIS (2017). 
 
The Mckinsey Global Institute4 is of the opinion that there are three areas of 
risk. The first is the debt of households, non-financial corporations, and government. 
The second is the growth of lending in local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). 
The third is that around one-third of outstanding debt is due to the shadow banking 
system. Based on a careful “Minsky” reading of a McKinsey Institute report, one may 
think that the Chinese financial system is in a Ponzi situation, but how can this 
hypothesis be demonstrated? In order to explain the development of credit expansion 
and the risk such a situation poses, I will distribute the total credit in four areas: (i) 
3 In fifteen years, traditional banking went from being the only channel of financing to accounting 
for only three-fifths of the new credit (The Economist 2016). 
4 “First, roughly half of the debt of households, non-financial corporations, and government is 
associated with real estate, either directly or indirectly. The second risk is rapid growth in lending to local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs), many of which may struggle to repay. A 2014 audit of local 
governments found that more than 20 percent of recent loans were used to pay older debts and that almost 
40 percent of debt servicing and repayments were funded by land sales. The third risk stems from the fact 
that around one-third of outstanding debt in China is provided by its rapidly growing, opaque shadow 
banking system” (McKinsey Global Institute 2015, 73).  
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credit to non-financial corporations; (ii) credit to households; (iii) credit to the general 
government; and (iv) credit of banking institutions. 
 
Credit to Non-Financial Corporations  
 
About 64 percent of the credit provided to the non-financial sector is used by 
corporations. The excessive growth of such credit made it necessary for Zhou 
Xiaochuan, governor of the central bank of China, to point it out. He also mentioned 
that China is still on course to decrease its corporative debt to manageable levels, but 
the means to contain it will be through restructuring disabled enterprises so that they 
are able to meet their commitments (Waldmeir 2016). Thus, the banking system 
stability in China will greatly depend on corporations’ ability to pay back their debts. 
Between 2007 and 2017, the credit granted to corporations went from 106 to 165 
percent of GDP, growing at an annual average rate of 18.3 percent and adding up to 
18.331 billion dollars to the national debt as of March 2017 (Figure 2). 
A large credit expansion took place between 2009 and 2013, when credit 
increased by 25.2 percent. This expansion happened as a result of the anti-cyclical 
policies applied by the central bank of China.  An example of such a policy was the 
effort to boost the economy by applying a 1.8-billion-dollar credit injection or a 
program specifically targeting infrastructure investment in October of 2008 (Girón 
2009). One development worthy of mention is the deceleration of the growth variable 
in 2015 (accompanied by a decrease in economic growth), when it only increased by 3 
percent of GDP (or by 1,062 billion dollars). This behavior of the economy may have 
been a consequence of the central bank’s concern for the healthcare sector in China. 
 
Figure 2. Credit to Non-Financial Corporations 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BIS (2017). 
 
Credit to Households 
 
Despite the fact that credit given to households constitutes only 18 percent of 
total credit granted, household credit is the variable with the most growth. Between 
2007 and 2017, the credit granted to households increased four and a half times. It 
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rose from 10 to 45 percent of GDP, while the average annual growth rate of the same 
period became 32 percent, reaching 5,050 billion dollars during the first trimester of 
2017 (Figure 3). The period with the greatest expansion of credit took place between 
2006 and 2010, as the household credit variable increased at an annual average rate of 
58 percent, jumping from 10 to 27 percent of GDP. This increase in credit granted to 
households has been accompanied by a major economic expansion in China in the 
last sixteen years , with an average growth rate of 11.2 percent. 
A problem regarding the financing for households is linked to the increase in 
mortgage loans, which represent around 60 percent of the debt of urban households 
(Tang 2017). IMF estimates that more than one third of that debt stems from 
seriously indebted households, which is evident in the greater deterioration of balance 
sheets (IMF 2017). Faced with this fact, the government took preventive measures like 
restricting estate purchases and limiting the number of apartments that a household 
can own (Cheng 2017). 
 
Figure 3. Credit to Households 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BIS (2017).  
 
Credit to the General Government 
 
In the period between 2007 and 2017, the debt of the government increased at 
an annual average rate of 20 percent. In other words, it increased from 25.7 to 46.9 
percent of GDP, reaching 5,207 billion dollars in the first trimester of 2017. 
Notwithstanding the extent of credit granted to households, the impact has been the 
opposite of the intended, which is visible in a constant drop in economic growth — an 
issue that has received the least amount of attention on an international level (Figure 
4). 
 
Banking Institutions 
 
Statistics from China’s Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC 2015) shows 
that, at the end of 2015, the total amount of bank assets was 32.15 trillion dollars, 
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which represents an increase of about 27 trillion, or 15.7 percent as compared to 
2014. The average growth rate between 2013 and 2015 was 18 percent, but the 
greater expansion took place in 2009, when the total amount of assets increased by 
25.9 percent — this is 7 percent greater than the average for the period I study. On the 
other hand, the total of liabilities was 29.7 trillion dollars, which is a 15.1-percent 
increase as compared to 2014. The average annual growth rate for the period between 
2003 and 2015 was 17.5 percent. It is worth mentioning that passives in 2013 
decreased from a 17.5 to a 13.8 percent on average (Table 1). In 2015, the loans from 
banking institutions reached sixteen trillion dollars (or 99.3 yuan), which represented 
an increase of 14.5 percent as compared to 2014. Between 2003 and 2015, bank 
credit had an average growth rate of 16 percent, with its greater expansion occurring 
in 2009, when it increased by 32 percent increase (this is double as compared to the 
period under study). 
 
Figure 4. Credit to the General Government 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BIS (2017).  
 
Bank deposits represent the money delivered by saver agents to a bank with the 
objective of generating a future interest — that is, it symbolizes the sacrifice of current 
consumption for future consumption. Between 2013 and 2015, bank deposits grew at 
an average rate of 19 percent and reached 22.54 trillion dollars. It is worth 
mentioning that the growth rate has shown little fluctuation when compared to its 
average value, which indicates trust in the banking system, despite the financial crisis 
and economic deceleration. The period of greater growth of bank deposits happened 
in 2007 and 2008, with an increase of 32.6 percent. Also, between 2008 and 2015, 
the benefits after taxes grew at an average rate of 24.5 percent, with the amount of the 
variable being barely 0.318 trillion dollars. The Chinese banking system is controlled 
by state banks and a great amount of credit is still directed toward specific projects. 
Because banks are state entities, their goal is not to look for profit, but to increase 
social welfare. This could be shown by examining the year 2009, when the growth of 
benefits after taxes dropped to 14.7 percent. In other words, there have been fewer 
benefits in moments of economic difficulties. 
 
Is China Living a Minsky Moment?  
 
451 
 
Table 1. Banking Institutions (Trillion USD) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CBRC (2015).  
 
Channeling and Financialization, a PBOC Concern 
 
The need for financing in a monetary economy of production corresponds to the 
interactions between investment and consumption throughout the economic cycle. 
To satisfy the demand for investment and consumption from economic agents, 
indebtedness is necessary as the essential financing mechanism. Financial fragility, 
panic, and asset deflation increase due to the accumulation of debts, which is the 
result of new combinations and “creative destruction.” Financial instability is constant 
in a monetary economy of production. The demand for capital flows in the phase of 
the expansionary cycle allows new combinations, while the conditions for fragility in 
the future are created by prosperity. On one hand, the process of “creative 
destruction,” referred to by Joseph Schumpeter (1968) in the face of technological 
change and new products in the market, creates the conditions of fragility for 
companies that leave the market when they are unable to repay their liabilities. 
On the other hand, as Minsky points out, debts accumulation in prosperity 
“does not allow units to fulfill their payment commitments” (Minsky 1964, 178). By 
conceiving money as a flow of capital and not as a stock of money, its flow plays a very 
important role in financing the financial units. Thus, there will be hedged, 
speculative, and Ponzi finances that will lead financial units to a deflation of financial 
assets until reaching the economic cycle of panic, recession, and depression. From a 
heterodox perspective, one can observe a trend in the Chinese economy on the 
financing process endorsed and sustained by PBOC. Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms, the strengthening of PBOC, the formation of a financial system to maintain 
economic development, and the insertion of China in the world market, all provided 
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the country with a formidable place in the world. These factors functioned as its 
locomotive that kept the process of growth before the collapse of the international 
financial system in 2008.  
The PBOC performance following the injection of $1.8 billion dollars in 2009, 
and the constantly growing public and private indebtedness represents 281 percent of 
China’s GDP, with 55 percent public debt and 51 percent government debt (Liang 
2016). It is not the main commercial banks that have been favored by the position of 
PBOC, as stated by academics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), but 
the shadow Chinese financial system. It is calculated that the problem of the shadow 
financial system, whose value is estimated between 2.3 and 4.8 billion dollars, has 
surprisingly grown and is now facing a Ponzi situation. PBOC’s intervention, 
therefore, was not coincidental when assets fell by 29 percent in only two months and 
fragility in financial circuits increased (Stewart 2015). 
Unlike investment in the United States, the shadow financial system in China 
consists of trust companies, which are non-financial institutions that lend money and 
take direct shareholdings as shareholders. Most financing for the China’s HNA 
Group,5 Dalian Wanda, Fosun, Anbang, and Zhejiang Rossoneri comes from Chinese 
domestic investors, and growth operations have been significant overseas. The 
government is concerned about large companies, whose investments are outside 
mainland China (The Economist 2017), as well as about the recent moratorium on 
companies like Chaori Co., China Shanshui Cement Group, Boarden Tianwei 
Group, Cloud Live, ZhuhaiZhongfu, China National Erzhong Group, China 
National Machinery Industry Corp. (Sinomach), Sinosteel Co., Dongbei Special Steel 
Group, Shanxi Huayu Energy, and China Railway Material (Table 1). 
 
Reflections 
 
Recent interviews with members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences6 on the 
situation of the Chinese financial system seem to agree on the impossibility of a 
financial crisis because of the strength of the state. The increased amount of expired 
portfolios in Chinese banks, the weakness of the financial system, as well as the 
instability of currency and the exit of capitals have all been perceived as alarm signs 
since 2015. However, China will likely not have a financial crisis as the one 
experienced by the United States between 2006 and 2008, and a bankruptcy of the 
magnitude of Lehman Brothers is even less likely. On the contrary, China is a country 
with a strong economic state and there is a “big government,” as defined by Minsky, 
which is able to endure a decrease in production and an increase in bad financial 
5 In December, HNA said it received pledges of support for 2018 from eight big domestic policy and 
commercial banks, including China Development Bank, the Export and Import Bank of China, and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Miller 2017). 
6 Interviews were made during an academic exchange program between UNAM and CASS for 
Chinese academics from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who specialize in financial matters of 
diverse institutes, in November 2016. 
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assets of its financial investors. The role played by PBOC has allowed stability in 
China in the context of a globally unstable environment of financial circuits. 
Despite initiating a gradual deregulation and financial liberalization process, 
operations outside the balance sheet of many banking institutions have increased the 
shadow financial system (SFS) in China. SFS has been financing projects at a global 
level within the framework of OBOR. As Yan Liang (2016, 462) states, it is important 
to emphasize that “the rapid growth of shadow banks in China is driven both by 
structural and transitory forces. Structurally, China’s state-dominated banking sector 
lends mainly to state-owned enterprises and leaves many of the small and medium size 
enterprises underfinanced. Moreover, given the ceiling on deposit rates, many savers 
seek alternative venues for their savings. WMPs provide a weighted average yield of 
5.5%, compared to the 3.0% one-year deposit rate.” 
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Table 1A. Terminology 
Source: CBRC (2015). 
